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Contrarian Real Estate Investment in Some Asia Pacific Cities 
 
Abstract 
The profitability of contrarian investment strategy (i.e. investing in value stocks) is one of 
the most well-established empirical facts in the finance literature. It would appear, 
however, that the strategy has not been extended to real estate. Thus, the paper examines 
the contrarian investment strategy in relation to real estate so as to ascertain the 
comparative advantage(s) (in terms of performance) of “value” and “growth” property 
investments. It is found, after a case study of eleven cities in the Asia Pacific over the 
period 1994Q2 through 2004Q2, that contrarian real estate investment consistently 
outperformed growth property investment. The results of stochastic dominance test 
validate the relative superiority of “value” over “growth” property investment. This 
implies that fund managers who traditionally have been favoring prime (i.e. growth) 
property investment may have to reconsider their investment strategy if they want to 
maximize their return. 
 
Keywords: contrarian investment strategy, value-growth spread, value properties, 
growth properties, stochastic dominance. 
 
1. Introduction 
The choice of an investment strategy is an important step in the decision-making process 
of fund managers and large institutional investors. As a result, growth stock investment 
strategy and value stock investment strategy have received a great deal of attention in the 
finance literature. The growth stock investment strategy is frequently associated with 
investments in “glamour” stocks that have relatively high price-to-earnings ratios (i.e. 
high gross income multiplier in real estate terms1). On the other hand, value stock 
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investment strategy usually involves investing in “gloomy” stocks that characteristically 
have relatively low market prices in relation to earnings per share (EPS),  cash flow per 
share,  book value per share, or  dividends per share (i.e. low gross income multiplier).  
They are often less popular stocks that have recently experienced low or negative growth 
rates in corporate earnings. Yet, studies have shown that investments in value stocks, 
commonly known as contrarian investment strategies, have outperformed growth stocks 
in major markets (see for example, Fama and French [1993, 1995, 1996, 1998], Capual et 
al. [1993], Haugen [1995], Arshanapali et al. [1998], Levis and Liodakis [2001] and 
Lakonishok et al. [1994]).  
 
However, Jones (1993) reports that the profitability of contrarian portfolios is a pre-WW 
II phenomenon that has since largely disappeared. Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) find 
that the Canadian stock market exhibits significant price inertia, which negates the 
relative superiority of contrarian investments. Moreover, Jedadeesh and Titman (1993), 
Rouwenhorst (1998 & 1999) and Grundy and Martin (2001) conclude that a momentum 
strategy (which contrasts the contrarian strategy) is profitable. These contrary findings 
have been refuted in the extant literature (see for example, Bauman and Miller 1997]). 
 
In view of the significance of the contrarian hypothesis in the finance literature and the 
relationship between finance and real estate, it is surprising the contrarian hypothesis can 
hardly be found in the extant real estate literature. Thus, the motivation of the paper is to 
bridge this gap in the extant real estate literature in an attempt to put it on the real estate 
research agenda to promote discussion on the issue. 
 
In view of the overwhelming evidence in support of the superior performance of 
contrarian investment in the finance literature, there appears to be a prima facie case for 
expecting contrarian real estate investment to do likewise (Addae-Dapaah et al. (2002)).  
Growth stock is analogous to prime properties as both have relatively low earnings-to- 
price ratio (i.e. low initial yield – see Tse, 2002) and investors in both investment media 
pin their hopes on a relatively high potential price or capital appreciation. Similarly, 
value stock that provides high income is comparable to high income-producing properties 
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such as lower grade properties and properties in secondary locations. In relation to real 
property, the contrarian strategy implies that value properties with high running yield 
could outperform growth properties with low running yield. Thus, the objectives of the 
study are: 
i) to ascertain the comparative advantage(s), in terms of performance, of contrarian real 
estate investment; 
ii) to evaluate the relative riskiness of value properties and growth properties;  
iii) to establish whether excessive extrapolation and expectational errors characterize 
growth and value strategies.  
 
 
In view of this, the next section provides a brief review of the finance literature on the 
contrarian investment strategy after which, a specific set of research hypotheses are 
formulated. This is followed by a discussion on data management and sourcing, and the 
contrarian strategy model. The next section is devoted to the empirical model estimation 
which is followed by a post-model estimation. The last section deals with concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Dreman (1982) defines a contrarian as an investor who goes against the “grain”. Hence, 
contrarian investment strategy simply refers to investment in securities on which other 
investors have turned their backs. It covers various investment strategies based on 
buying/selling stocks that are priced low/high relative to accounting measures of 
performance – earnings-to-price ratios (E/P), cash flow-to-price ratio (C/P) and book 
value-to-price ratio (B/P) – as well strategies based on low/high measures of earning per 
share (EPS) growth (Capual, 1993). In simple terms, the contrarian investment strategy 
refers to the value/growth stock paradigm. 
 
While there is substantial empirical evidence supporting the efficient market hypothesis 
that security prices provide unbiased estimates of the underlying values, many still 
question its validity. Smidt (1968) argues that one potential source of market inefficiency 
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is inappropriate market responses to information. The inappropriate responses to 
information implicit in Price-Earnings (P/E) ratios may be indicators of future investment 
performance of a security. Proponents of this price-ratio hypothesis claim that low P/E 
securities tend to outperform high P/E stocks (Williamson, 1970). Basu (1977), Jaffe et 
al. (1989), Fama and French (1992, 1998), Davis (1994), Lakonishok et al. (1994), 
Bauman et al. (1998), and Chan and Lakonishok (2004) show a positive relationship 
between earnings yield and equity returns. However, as a result of the noisy nature of 
earnings (i.e. the category of stocks with low E/P include also stocks that have 
temporarily depressed earnings), value strategies based on E/P give narrower spreads 
compared to other simple value strategies (Chan and Lakonishok (2004)). Furthermore, 
in view of the noise in reported earnings that results from Japanese accounting standards 
(i.e. distortions in the earnings induced by accelerated depreciation allowances), Chan et 
al. (1991) find no evidence of a strong positive earnings yield effect after controlling for 
the other fundamental variables.  
 
Rosenberg et al. (1985) show that stocks with high Book Value relative to Market Value 
of equity (BV/MV) outperform the market. Further studies, e.g. Chan et al. (1991) and 
Fama and French (1992), confirm and extend these results. In view of the highly 
influential paper by Fama and French (1992), academics (e.g. Capaul et al., 1993; Davis, 
1994; Lakonishok et al., 1994; La Porta et al., 1997; Fama and French, 1998; Bauman et 
al., 1998 and 2001; Chan et al., 2000; and Chan and Lakonishok, 2004) have shifted their 
attention to the ratio of BV/MV as one of the leading explanatory variables for the cross-
section of average stock returns.  
 
Although BV/MV has garnered the lion’s share of attention as an indicator of value-
growth orientation, it is by no means an ideal measure (Chan and Lakonishok (2004)). 
BV/MV is not a ‘clean’ variable uniquely associated with economically interpretable 
characteristics of the firm (Lakonishok et al. (1994)). Many different factors are reflected 
in this ratio. A low BV/MV may describe a company with several intangible assets that 
are not reflected in accounting book value. A low BV/MV can also describe a company 
with attractive growth opportunities that do not enter the computation of book value but 
do enter the market price. A stock whose risk is low and future cash flows are discounted 
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at a low rate would have a low BV/MV as well. Finally, a low BV/MV may be 
reminiscent of an overvalued glamour stock.  
 
 
The shortcomings of accounting earnings have motivated a number of papers to explore 
the relationship between cash flow yields and stock returns. High Cash Flow to Price 
CF/P) stocks are identified as value stocks because their prices are low per dollar of cash 
flow, or the growth rate of their cash flows is expected to be low. Chan et al. (1991), 
Davis (1994), Lakonishok et al. (1994), Bauman et al. (1998), Fama and French (1998), 
and Chan and Lakonishok (2004) show that a high ratio of CF/P predicts higher returns. 
This is consistent with the idea that measuring the market’s expectations of future growth 
more directly gives rise to better value strategies (La Porta (1996)).  
 
To proxy for the market’s expectations of future growth, Fama and French (1998) and 
Bauman et al. (1998) also use ratio of Dividends to Price (D/P). Firms with higher ratios 
have lower expected growth and are considered to be value stocks. They show that the 
performance of the value stocks based on dividend yields is quantitatively similar to the 
performance based on the prior categorizations (i.e. P/E, BV/MV and CF/P). Finally, 
rather by expectations of future growth to operationalize the notions of glamour and 
value, Davis (1994) and Lakonishok et al. (1994) classify stocks based on past growth. In 
particular, they measure past growth by Growth in Sales (GS) and the spread in abnormal 
returns is sizeable.  
 
To the extent that the different valuation indicators of value-growth orientation are not 
highly correlated, a strategy based on information from several valuation measures may 
enhance portfolio performance. Lakonishok et al. (1994) explore sophiscated two-
dimensional versions of simple value strategies. According to the two-way classification,  
value stocks are defined as those that have shown poor growth in sales, earnings and cash 
flow in the past, and are expected by the market to continue growing slowly. Expected 
performance is measured by multiples of price to current earnings and cash flow. La 
Porta et al. (1997) form portfolios on the basis of a two-way classification based on past 
GS and CF/P introduced by Lakonishok et al. (1994). Using robust regression methods, 
Chan and Lakonishok (2004) estimate cross-sectional models that predicted future yearly 
returns from beginning-year values of the BV/MV, CF/P, E/P and the sales to price ratio. 
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The use of the multiple measures in the composite indicators boosts the performance of 
the value strategy.  
 
 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) controvert the above findings by showing that a 
momentum strategy (i.e. buying/selling past winners/losers) generates better returns. This 
conclusion has been concurred by Rouwenhorst (1998 & 1999) and Grundy and Martin 
(2001). Jones (1993) reports that the profitability of contrarian portfolios is a pre-WW II 
phenomenon that has since largely disappeared. However, this has been refuted by later 
studies which include post-war data.  Also, Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) suggest that 
positive profits resulting from the use of the contrarian investment strategy are limited to 
the U.S. stock market. When applied to the Canadian stock market, the DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985) do not produce favorable results. Instead of finding significant price 
reversals, Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) find that the Canadian stock market exhibits 
significant price continuation behavior, which does not support contrarian investments. 
This is also refuted by later studies that conclude mean-reversion tendency (see for 
example, Bauman and Miller [1997]). 
 
Based on the accumulated weight of the evidence from past studies, the academic 
community agrees that value investment strategies, on average, outperform growth 
investment strategies. The only polemical issue about the contrarian strategy is the 
rationale for its superior performance. Competing explanations include risk premiums 
(Fama and French, 1993, 1995, 1996), systematic errors in investors’ expectations and 
analysts’ forecasts – i.e. naïve investor expectations of future growth and research design 
induced bias (see for example, La Porta et al., 1997; Bauman & Miller, 1997; La Porta, 
1996; Dechow & Sloan, 1997; Lakonishok et al., 1994; Lo and MacKinlay, 1990; 
Kothari et al., 1995) and the existence of market frictions (Amihud and Mendelson, 
1986) . 
 
2.1 Rationale for the Superior Performance of the Contrarian Strategy 
 
The traditional view, led by Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996), is that the superior 
performance is a function of contrarian investment being relatively risky (see also Chan, 
1988; Ball and Kothari, 1989). However, Lakonishok et al. (1994), MacKinley (1995), 
La Porta et al. (1995, 1997), Daniel and Titman (1996) have found that risk-based 
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explanations do not provide a credible rationale for the observed return behaviour (see 
Jaffe et al. (1989), Chan et al. (1991), Chopra et al. (1992), Capaul et al. (1993), Bauman 
et al. (1998, 2001), and Chan and Lakonishok (2004)).  
 
 
The behavioural finance paradigm recognizes psychological influences on human 
decision-making in which experts (in this case, investors) tend to focus on, and overuse, 
predictors of limited validity (i.e., earnings trend in the recent past) in making forecasts. 
In view of systematic errors in investors’ expectations and analysts’ forecasts, it has been 
argued that a significant portion of value stocks’ superior performance is attributable to 
earning surprises (see De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Lakonishok et al., 1994; La Porta, 
1996; Chan et al., 2000, 2003). According to Dreman and Berry (1995) and Levis and 
Liodakis (2001), positive and negative earnings surprises have an asymmetrical effect on 
the returns of value and growth stocks. Positive earning surprises have a 
disproportionately large positive impact on value stocks while negative surprises have a 
relatively benign effect on such stocks (see also Bauman and Miller, 1997). 
 
Furthermore, analysts and institutional investors may have their own reasons for 
gravitating toward growth stocks. Analysts have self-interest in recommending successful 
stocks to generate trading commissions and more investment banking business. 
Moreover, growth stocks are typically in ‘promising’ industries, and are thus easier to 
promote in terms of analyst reports and media coverage (Bhushan, 1989; and Jegadeesh 
et al., 2004). These considerations play into the career concerns of institutional money 
managers (Lakonishok et al., 1994). Another important factor is that most investors have 
shorter time horizons than are required for value strategies to consistently pay off (De 
Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). The result of all these considerations is 
that value stocks/glamour stocks become under-priced/overpriced relative to their 
fundamentals. Due to the limits of arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), the mispricing 
patterns can persist over long periods of time.  
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A third hypothesis that has been postulated for the superiority of the contrarian strategy is 
that the reported cross-sectional return differences is an artifact of the research design and 
the database used to conduct the study (Black, 1993; Kothari et al., 1995). Thus, the 
abnormal returns would be reduced or vanish if different methodology and data were 
used. Such researchers argue that the superior returns are the result of survivor biases in 
the selection of firms (Banz and Breen, 1986), look-ahead bias (Banz and Breen, 1986), 
and a collective data-snooping exercise by many researchers sifting through the same 
data (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990). Other problems include model specification (i.e. the 
appropriateness of parametric analysis and single factor capital asset pricing model) and 
misestimation of systematic risk (Mun et al. [2001], Badrinath and Omesh [2001]). 
Finally, the database is limited to a relatively short sample period (Davis, 1994). The 
data-snooping explanation has been controverted by Lakonishok et al. (1994), Davis 
(1994, 1996), Fama and French (1998), Bauman and Conover (1999), Bauman et al., 
(2001), and Chan and Lakonishok (2004) who used databases that are free of 
survivorship bias and/or fresh data that previously have not been used for such analysis to 
confirm the superior performance of value strategy.  Mun et al. (2001:635) refute the 
model specification criticism to conclude that the result of nonparametric analysis “is a 
distilled and pure Contrarian Strategy effect” – The parametric analysis confirms 
contrarian superiority although it provides a more conservative yield estimate of excess 
returns than parametric estimates. Similarly, Badrinath and Omesh (2001) conclude that 
misestimation of systematic risk cannot explain the abnormal profitability of the 
contrarian strategy (see Gregory et al. [2003]). Thus, the superiority of the contrarian 
strategy is not a function of the mathematical/statistical models used for the analysis. 
 
Furthermore, two features of value investing distinguish it from other possible anomalies. 
According to Chan and Lakonishok (2004), many apparent violations of the efficient 
market hypothesis, such as day-of-the-week patterns in stock returns, lack a convincing 
logical basis and the anomalous pattern is merely a statistical fluke that has been 
uncovered through data mining. The value premium, however, can be tied to ingrained 
patterns of investor behavior or the incentives of professional investment managers.  
 
In view of the analogy between value stock and high income producing property 
(henceforth called value property2), the features of the contrarian investment strategy may 
apply to property investment. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
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a)  Ho: Return value properties = Return growth properties 
Ha: Return value properties  Return growth properties 
b) Ho: Risk value properties = Risk growth properties 
Ha: Risk value properties  Risk growth properties 
The first hypothesis will be operationalised through statistical testing of the significance 
of the value-growth spread. If the spread is found to be statistically significant, the second 
hypothesis will be used to ascertain whether the superior performance of value property 
is a function of it having a higher risk than growth property. 
 
3. Data Sourcing and Management 
A growth real estate investor prefers properties with a low initial yield which is more 
than compensated by a prospect of high future capital or rental growth to properties with 
high initial yield. The investor chooses to exchange immediate cash flows for higher 
future cash flows that are worth more at the date of the purchase, depending on the 
investor’s opportunity cost of capital. On the other hand, a value property investor prefers 
to receive a high initial yield rather than to wait for future income or capital growth (see 
Marcato [2004]). The paper uses the Jones Lang Lasalle Real Estate Intelligence Service-
Asia (JLL REIS-Asia) and the Property Council of New Zealand databases from 1994Q2 
to 2004Q2 to categorize twenty-one Pacific Rim office property sub-markets into 
value/growth sub-markets on the bases of their initial yields (Table1), i.e. E/P ratio. 
 
JLL REIS-Asia dataset consists of ex post quarterly (since 1994) and ex-ante annual 
(forecasts for the next 4 years) capital and rental values of prime commercial properties 
for 16 Asia real estate market sectors (i.e. eight retail sectors and eight office sectors). 
The capital and rental values of commercial real estate assets (office and retail) in the 
eight cities are based on a basket of 30 prime commercial buildings per sector in each 
city. Rental values are based on actual rents while the capital values are based on 
transactions and estimated valuations. The JLL REIS-Asia ex ante data are derived from 
JLL’s proprietary quantitative forecasting and the consensus views of the JLL network of 
branch offices in Asian cities, namely: Singapore (the Raffles Place CBD), Beijing, 
Shanghai, Hong Kong (the Central & major business districts), Bangkok, Manila (Makati 
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CBD), Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta3. The criteria for selecting investment grade offices for 
the dataset are the same for all the markets in the sample. Thus, the dataset provides a 
basis for comparing like with like. Similarly, the data from the Property Council of New 
Zealand are based on market rentals and valuations. The quality of this data is attested by 
the fact that it has been currently subsumed by the IPD. Both datasets are extensively 
used by researchers in Singapore and New Zealand. The only caveat about the use of two 
different datasets is that one cannot guarantee that the quality of both datasets is the same. 
However, both datasets are of very good quality to provide credible results. 
 
 The other accounting measures of classification are not employed in the analyses 
because of the dearth of data. Moreover, the extant literature shows that the results of 
studies based on the other accounting measures of classification confirm, rather than 
contradict, the results of studies based on E/P (i.e. initial yield) classification. Thus, the 
inability to use these accounting measures (due to lack of data) is not a major handicap. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To facilitate cross-market comparisons, the initial yields are measured in U.S. dollars. At 
the end of each quarter between 1994Q2 and 2004Q2, quartile portfolios are formed on 
the basis of the end-of-previous-quarter’s initial yield. One-fourth of the sample with the 
highest initial yields is treated as the value properties (Vp) while the one-fourth with the 
lowest initial yields is considered to be growth properties (Gp). Quartile 2 (denoted as 
value2 in Figure 1) has the properties with the second highest yields, while Quartile 3 
(denoted as growth2 in Exhibit 8) has the properties with the second lowest yields. Each 
quartile is treated as a portfolio composed of equally weighted properties. This system of 
classification follows the classification used in the finance literature (see for example: 
Chan et al. (1991) and Bauman et al. (1998, 2001)). 
 
The grouping of the twenty-one office property markets into quartile portfolios is 
followed by an investigation of the relative performances of the value and growth 
properties. If there is evidence of a value premium in the Pacific Rim office property 
markets, the paper will discuss the underlying reasons behind the relative superiority of 
value properties.  
Table 1 
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4. The Contrarian Strategy Model  
 
The performances of both the value and growth properties are compared on a 1-quarter, 
3-year, 5-year, and entire holding-period (of up to 40 quarters) horizons. In the evaluation 
of the relative superiority of the performance of quartile portfolios, periodic (i.e. quarter-
by-quarter) return measure is used. The periodic returns are quantified as simple holding 
period returns. For the longer investment horizon (i.e. 3-year, 5-year and entire holding-
period), the simple holding period returns are calculated for each quarter and 
compounded to obtain the multi-year holding-period returns as defined in equation (1). 
       11...11 21  mt rrrr  (Levy, 1999).    (1) 
Where 
 r1, r2…rm = return for each quarter of the period m. 
 m             = number of quarters for the holding period.  
 
 Compared to simply adding the returns for all quarters of a given period, equation (1) is 
more accurate (Sharpe et al., 1998). The periodic quartile returns for each holding- period 
horizon are averaged across the full period of study to determine the time-weighted 
average return. Arithmetic mean is most widely used in forecasts of future expectations 
and in portfolio analysis (Geltner and Miller, 2001). Each value-growth spread (i.e. value 
premium) is then computed by subtracting the mean return on a growth quartile from that 
on the corresponding value quartile. 
 
The pooled-variance t test and separate-variance t test are then used to determine whether 
there is a significant difference between the means of the value and growth properties. If 
the p-value is smaller than the conventional levels of significance (i.e. 0.05 and 0.10), the 
null hypothesis that the two means are equal will be rejected: 
 growthvalueH  :0   
 growthvalueH  :1  
 
 
The next step is to determine whether any difference in returns is a function of variation 
in risk, using a more direct evaluation of the risk-based explanation that focuses on the 
performance of the value and growth properties in ‘bad’ states of the world. Traditional 
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measures of risk such as standard deviation of returns, risk-to-return ratio (i.e. coefficient 
of variation – CV) and return-to-risk ratio will be utilized.  
 
The Levene’s Test is used to test the equality of the variances for the value and growth 
properties:  
 growthvalueH
22
0 :    
 growthvalueH
22
1 :    
 
4.1  Performance in ‘Bad’ States of the World  
According to Lakonishok et al. (1994), value strategies would be fundamentally riskier 
than glamour strategies if:  
i) they under-perform glamour strategies in some states of the world, and  
ii) those are on average ‘bad’ states of the world, in which the marginal utility of wealth 
is high, making value strategies unattractive to risk-averse investors.  
 
Periods of severe stock market declines are used as a proxy for ‘bad’ states of the world. 
This is because they generally correspond to periods when aggregate wealth is low and 
thus the utility of an extra dollar is high. The approach of examining property 
performance during down markets also corresponds to the notion of downside risk that 
has gained popularity in the investment community (Chan and Lakonishok, 2004). If the 
above tests confirm the superiority of value properties, stochastic dominance will be used 
to ascertain the optimality of the value property investment strategy. 
 
5. Stochastic Dominance 
The most widely known and applied efficiency criterion for evaluating investments is the 
mean-variance model. An alternative approach is the stochastic dominance (SD) analysis, 
which has been employed in various areas of economics, finance and statistics (Levy, 1992; Al-
khazali, 2002; Kjetsaa and Kieff, 2003). The efficacy and applicability of SD analysis, and its 
relative advantages over the mean-variance approach have been discussed and proven by 
several researchers including Hanoch and Levy (1969), Hadar and Russell (1969), Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1970), Whitmore, 1970, Levy (1992), Al-khazali (2002) and Barrett and Donald 
(2003). According to Taylor and Yodder (1999), SD is a theoretically unimpeachable general 
model of portfolio choice that maximizes expected utility. It uses the entire probability density 
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function rather than simply summarizing a distribution’s features as given by its statistical 
moments. 
 
5.1 Stochastic Dominance Criteria 
The SD rules are normally specified as first, second, and third degree SD criteria denoted by 
FSD, SSD, and TSD respectively (see Levy, 1992; Barrett and Donald, 2003; Barucci, 2003). 
There is also the nth degree SD. Given that F and G are the cumulative distribution functions of 
two mutually exclusive risky options X and Y, F dominates G (FDG) by FSD, SSD, and TSD, 
denoted by FD1G, FD2G, and FD3G, respectively, if and only if, 
    XGXF      for all X (FSD)   (2) 
      0  dttFtG
x
   for all X (SSD)   (3) 
      0   

dtdtFtG
x
  for all X, and 
       TSDXEXE GF        (4) 
The FSD (also referred to as the General Efficiency Criterion – Levy and Sarnat, 1972) 
assumes that all investors prefer more wealth to less regardless of their attitude towards risk. 
The SSD is based on the economic notion that investors are risk averse while the TSD posits 
that investors exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (Kjetsaa and Kieff, 2003). A higher 
degree SD is required only if the preceding lower degree SD does not conclusively resolve the 
optimal choice problem. Thus, if FD1G, then for all values of x, F(x) ≤ G(x) or G(x) - F(x) ≥ 0. 
Since the expression cannot be negative, it follows that for all values of x, the following must 
also hold: 
      0  dttFtG
x
; that is, FD2G  (Levy and Sarnat, 1972) 
 
Furthermore, the SD rules and the relevant class of preferences Ui are related in the following 
way: 
FSD: )()()()( XUEXUEXXGXF GF    1Uu , (5) 
SSD:      XUEXUEXdttGdttF GF
x x
  )(   2Uu , (6) 
TSD:        XUEXUEXdtdtGdtdtF GF
x xx
       

 
      3Uu , and 
 15 
         XEXE GF  ,   (7) 
where iU = utility function class (i =1, 2, 3) 
 1U  includes all u with 0'u ; 
 2U  includes all u with 0'u and 0'' u ; and 
 3U  includes all u with 0'u , 0'' u  and 0''' u . 
In other words, a lower degree SD is embedded in a higher degree SD. The economic 
interpretation of the above rules for the family of all concave utility functions is that their 
fulfilment implies that  xUEF   xUEG  and  xEF    xEG ; i.e. the expected utility and 
return of the preferred option must be greater than the expected utility and return of the 
dominated option.  
 
 
6. Empirical Model Estimation – A Test of the Extrapolation Model  
 
Following the evaluation of the risk characteristics of the value and growth properties, the 
final task is to investigate the relationship between the past, the forecasted, and the actual 
future growth rates. This relationship is largely consistent with the predictions of the 
extrapolation model. The essence of extrapolation is that investors are excessively 
optimistic about growth properties and excessively pessimistic about value properties. A 
direct test of extrapolation (Lakonishok et al. (1994)), then, is to look directly at the 
actual future rental income and capital growth rates of value and growth properties, and 
compare them to:  
 a)  past growth rates and  
 b)  expected growth rates as implied by the initial yields.  
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the initial yields for each quartile. Over the 
full period of study from 1994Q2 to 2004Q2, the median rental-to-price ratio for the 
value quartile (9.88%) was substantially higher than the growth quartile (3.97%). The 
median rental-to-price ratio ranges from 7.42% to 22.32% for the value properties, and 
1.86% to 5.11% for the growth properties.  
 
According to the initial yield classification (Table 1), office properties in locations such 
as Auckland CBD, Hong Kong Wanchai, Raffles Place, Shenton Way and Tokyo CBD 
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are often classified as glamour properties while office properties in Bangkok CBD, 
Jakarta CBD, Makati CBD, Seoul and Shanghai Puxi are often associated with value 
properties.  
 
 Table 2 
 
6.1 Performance of the Contrarian Strategy  
 
The returns and value-growth spread for the 1-quarter holding period are presented in 
Table 3. The high initial yield (i.e. value) properties enjoyed positive returns in 40 out of 
40 quarters while the low initial yield (i.e. growth) properties suffered negative returns in 
11 out of the 40 quarters. Value properties also outperformed the growth properties 
throughout the 40 quarters, with the value-growth spread ranging from 0.81% to 17.58% 
per quarter. The mean quarterly returns for value and growth properties were10.94% and 
2.41% respectively during the period – a mean quarterly value premium of 8.52%. 
Table 3 
 
 
The long-horizon returns (of up to 40 quarters) are presented in Tables 4 to 6. Because of 
various market microstructure issues as well as execution costs, the long-horizon returns 
are closer to what investors can actually expect.  
Table 4 
Exhibit 4 demonstrates the superiority of the performance of value portfolios over 
growth-property portfolios. The mean 3-year holding period return for value/growth 
portfolios is 165.24%/26.59%. The value premium ranges from 40.70% to 303.76%. 
These figures are equivalent to an annualized value premium of between 3.44% and 
6.72%. On the average, anyone who invested in value portfolios would have been 
138.65% richer per 3-year holding period than anyone who invested in growth portfolios. 
The superior performance of value portfolios is further attested by the results for the 5-
year and the longer-term holding periods presented in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
Tables 5 & 6. 
 
 
The mean 5-year holding period return for value/growth portfolios is 259.71%/45.17% 
(Table 5). The value premium for the 5-year holding period ranges from 133.77% to 
330.70% - an annualized value premium of 2.66% to 3.19%. These results are consistent 
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with Arshanapalli et al. (1998). Similarly, the mean returns for the longer holding periods 
(Table 6) are 530.37% (for value portfolios) and 67.03% (for growth portfolios). The 
value premium increases with the length of the holding period (Table 6). Anyone who 
invested in the value portfolios would have been 214.54% richer per 5-year holding 
period than his counterpart who invested in the growth portfolios. Similarly, an investor 
in the value portfolios would have been, on average, 695.02% wealthier than an investor 
in the growth portfolios over the longer holding periods. The differences between the 
mean returns for both portfolios are statistically significant at the 0.05 level (Table 7). 
 
Table 7 
 
The relative superiority of the value portfolio is confirmed by the results of stochastic 
dominance test presented in Figures 1a-d. 
Figures 1a-d 
Figure 1a shows that VpD1Gp, VpD2G2 while V2D2G2. Similarly, Figures 1b-d clearly 
reveal that the value portfolio stochastically dominates the other three portfolios in the 
first order – i.e. the value portfolio is the most efficient (and therefore the optimal) 
choice. This implies that value portfolio stochastically dominates growth portfolio in the 
first, second and third order. It provides a higher probability of receiving a return greater 
than or equal to a given holding period return than the growth portfolio. For example, 
Exhibit 8c shows that there was a 60% and 0% probability that the 5-year holding period 
return for value and growth portfolios respectively was greater than or equal to 200%. In 
other words, the value portfolio statistically prognosticated a higher probability of 
success.  Thus, value portfolio investment should have been preferable to both risk 
averters and risk lovers (Kjetsaa and Kieff, 2003; Levy and Sarnat, 1972). 
 
6.2 Are Contrarian Strategies Risky? 
 
Two alternative theories have been proposed to explain the superior performance of value 
strategies. The first theory states that value strategies expose investors to greater 
systematic risk (i.e. higher return is a reward for higher risk) while the second theory says 
that value strategies exploit the mistakes of naïve investors to provide superior returns.  
 
In addressing the first explanation, the paper examines the consistency of the 
performance of the value and growth strategies over time to ascertain the number of times 
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that “value” underperformed growth strategy. The paper then checks whether the times 
that “value” under-performed “growth” were times of severe market declines, i.e. “bad” 
states of the world, in which the marginal utility of consumption is high. If the value 
strategy is fundamentally riskier, it should under-perform the growth strategy during 
undesirable states of the world (Lakonishok et al., 1994). Finally, traditional measures of 
risk (i.e. standard deviation) and risk-adjusted performance indicator (i.e. coefficient of 
variation) are used to compare “value” and growth strategies.  
 
The results in Tables 3-6 show that the value strategy never under-performed the growth 
strategy in any holding period. In other words, there is no underperformance of the value 
portfolio to be associated with very bad states of the world as defined by some pay-off 
relevant factor.  
 
Some evidence on the performance of the value and growth properties in extreme down 
markets can be gleaned from Table 8a and 8b. Using the Datastream Indices (Pacific 
Basin Real Estate), the performance of the value and growth properties in the worst 
quarters for the stock market is compared (see Figure 2). The 40 quarterly data are 
classified into 4 states of the world: the worst 10 quarters (W10), the next worst 10 
quarters (NW10), the best 10 quarters (B10), and the next best 10 quarters (NB10) – 
Exhibit 10b. The quarterly returns on the various growth and value properties are then 
matched with the changes in the stock return. The average difference in returns between 
value and growth properties in each state is reported together with the corresponding t-
statistics for the test that the difference of returns is equal to zero (Table 8b), i.e. 
  
0:
0:


growthvalueo
growthvalueo
H
H


 
  
Figure 2 and Tables 8a & 8b 
 
An examination of Table 8b shows that the value strategy was not fundamentally riskier 
than the growth strategy. Value strategy did notably better than growth strategy in each of 
the 4 states of the world. In addition, as the p-value is less than 0.01 in each of the 4 
states of the world, the paper rejects the null hypothesis and concludes that there is 
statistical difference between the means of the two populations (i.e. value and growth 
properties). The value portfolio provided an average return of 10.83% per quarter in the 
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worst 10 quarters, whereas the growth portfolio provided 1.14% average quarterly return. 
Similarly, the value portfolio, on average, outperformed the growth portfolio by 8.16% 
per quarter in the next worst 10 quarters in which the index declined. In the very best 
quarters, the value strategy again outperformed the growth strategy by 8.09% (see Table 
8b). If anything, the superior performance of the value strategies was skewed towards 
negative market return months rather than positive market return months.  
 
Thus, it is implausible to conclude from this that the value strategy did particularly badly 
in the worst months for the stock market when the marginal utility of consumption was 
especially high. According to Lakonishok et al. (1994), performance in extreme bad 
states is often the last refuge of those claiming that a return strategy must be riskier, even 
when conventional measures of risk such as the beta and standard deviation do not show 
it. The evidence indicates that there are no significant traces of a conventional asset 
pricing equilibrium in which the higher returns on the value strategy are compensation 
for higher systematic risk.  
 
The volatility of the portfolios’ returns during the period of study is shown at the bottom 
of Tables 3 to 6. The results show that value portfolios recorded higher standard 
deviation of returns than growth portfolios for all the holding periods under 
consideration. The total risk, as measured by standard deviation, for the value portfolios 
was 4.62 percent, 93.88 percent, 85.17 percent and 471.80 percent respectively for the 
above holding periods. These are higher than the corresponding total risk of 4.48 percent, 
36.42 percent, 44.36 percent and 66.48 percent for the growth portfolios.  According to 
the results presented in Table 9, the higher value portfolio standard deviations for the 3-
year, 5-year and entire holding-period horizons are statistically and significantly 
different, at the 0.01 level, from those of the growth properties.  
 
Table 9 
 
However, standard deviation is not a good measure for comparison as the mean returns 
are different. In such a situation, the coefficient of variation provides a simple relative 
risk measure that may be used to compare portfolios having returns with different means 
and variances. Table 10 presents the average coefficient of variations and return-risk 
ratios for the various holding-periods.  
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Table 10 
 
 
The evidence show that the value portfolios are safer (as measured by CV) than the 
growth portfolios (Table 10). Furthermore, since value portfolio stochastically dominates 
growth portfolio, the latter is riskier than the former (Biswas, 1997). Hence, a risk model 
based on differences in standard deviation cannot also explain the superior returns on 
value properties.  
 
7. Post-Model Estimation – A Test of the Extrapolation Model  
 
In this section, the paper seeks to provide direct evidence that excessive extrapolation and 
expectational errors indeed characterize growth and value strategies. Table 11 presents 
some descriptive characteristics for the growth and value portfolios with respect to their 
initial yields, past growth rates, and future growth rates. Panel A reveals that the value 
portfolio had a much higher ratio of rental income to price. This ratio is interpreted in 
terms of lower expected growth rates for value properties. Panel B shows that, using 
several measures of past growth, including rental income and capital value, the return for 
growth properties grew faster than value properties over the 5 years before portfolio 
formulation. Panel C shows that over the 5 post-formulation years, the relative growth of 
rental income and capital value for growth properties was much less impressive.  
 
Table 11 
 
To interpret differences in initial yield in terms of expected rental growth rates, recall that 
the Gordon’s formula (Gordon and Shapiro (1956)) can be rewritten as 
dgR
P
I
k pNp 





  , where pk  is the initial yield for property, I is the current rental 
income, P is the market price, NR  is the required nominal return, and ( dg p  ) is the 
rental growth for actual, depreciating properties. Taken literally, these formulae imply 
that, holding discount rates constant, the differences in expected rental growth rates can 
be directly calculated based on differences in initial yields. Since the assumptions behind 
these simple formulae are restrictive (e.g. constant growth rates, etc.), the paper does not 
calculate exact estimates of the differences in expected rental growth rates between value 
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and growth portfolios. Instead, the paper asks whether the large differences in initial 
yields between value and growth properties can be justified by the differences in future 
rental growth rates.  
 
The past growth for glamour (i.e. growth) properties by any measure should be much 
faster than that of value properties. For example, over the 5 years before portfolio 
formation (i.e. 1994Q3 to 1999Q2), the average quarterly growth rate for rental income 
for the glamour portfolio was 1.35% compared to -2.70% for the value portfolio (see 
Panel B of Table 11).  
 
A dollar invested in the value portfolio in 2nd quarter 1999 was a claim to 10.05 cents of 
the then existing rental income while a dollar invested in the growth portfolio was a claim 
to only 4 cents of the rental income (Panel A of Table 11). Ignoring any difference in 
required rates of return, the large difference in initial yields have to be justified by an 
expectation of very different growth rates over a long period of time. Under the 
assumption that discount rates were approximately equal, the expected rental income for 
the growth portfolio must be higher than the value portfolio at some future date. 
Accordingly, investors would like to know the number of quarters it would take for the 
rental income per dollar invested in the growth portfolio (0.0400) to equal to the rental 
income of the value portfolio (0.1005), assuming that the differences in past rental 
income growth rates were to persist (i.e. 1.35% versus -2.70%). The answer turns out to 
be approximately 23 years (see Table 12). Note that this equality is based on a flow basis 
not on a present-value basis. Equality on a present-value analysis would require an even 
longer time period over which glamour properties should experience superior growth. 
Table 12 
 
These implied growth expectations to the actual rental growth experienced by the 
glamour and value portfolios can now be compared. Over the first 5 years after 
formation, the average rental income for the growth portfolios declined by 0.06% per 
quarter versus 1.52% for the value portfolio (see Panel C of Table 11). Hence, rental 
income per dollar invested in the growth portfolio fell from 0.0400 initially to 0.0394 at 
the end of Year 5. In the same way, rental income per dollar invested in the value 
portfolio fell from 0.1005 to 0.0853, still leaving a large gap in rental returns between the 
two portfolios in Year 5.  
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A similar conclusion emerges from an analysis of capital growth (Table 11). Over the 5 
years before portfolio formation, the average growth rate of capital value for the glamour 
portfolio was 0.08% per quarter versus -3.27% for the value portfolio. Once again, 
investors can examine the post-formulation growth rates to see whether higher post-
formulation growth for glamour could justify its lower initial yield. Over the 5 post-
formulation years, capital growth averaged -1.88% per quarter for glamour versus -0.42 
% per quarter for value. Hence, the average capital growth rate of glamour properties was 
minus 2450% while that for value properties improved 87.16%.  
 
These findings are consistent with the extrapolation model. Glamour properties have 
historically grown faster in rental income and capital value relative to value properties. 
According to the initial yield, the market expected the superior growth of glamour 
properties to continue for many years. However, over the 5 years after formation, growth 
rates of glamour properties and value properties were essentially negative. The evidence 
suggests that forecasts had been tied to past growth rates and were too optimistic for 
glamour properties relative to value properties. In other words, these results are consistent 
with the extrapolation model. Contrarian/glamour investors were pleasantly/unpleasantly 
surprised by the post formation portfolio results. This implies that naïve extrapolation of 
past performance is a credible explanation for the superiority of the contrarian strategy4. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
The paper set out to investigate the comparative advantage(s) of value portfolio and 
growth portfolio investments. The results of the study show that value portfolios out-
performed (in both absolute and risk-adjusted bases) growth portfolios over all the 
holding periods under consideration. The average value premium for the four different 
holding periods ranges from 8.52% (1-quarter holding period) to 463.34% (longer 
holding periods). Any one who invested in value portfolios over the entire ten-year period 
would have been 1843.36% wealthier than one who invested in growth portfolios over 
the same period. The difference between the performances of the value portfolio and the 
growth portfolio has been found to be statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Thus, the 
null hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean returns for the two portfolios 
is rejected. The relative superiority of the value portfolio investment is confirmed by 
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stochastic dominance test, which indicates that the value strategy is the optimal choice for 
both risk averters and risk lovers. 
 
Furthermore, the superior performances of value portfolios occurred in all the four “states 
of the world”. Therefore, the superior performance is not a compensation for higher risk 
as measured by the coefficient of variation (CV). The CVs for value portfolios were 
lower than growth portfolios in all the four holding periods. These findings are consistent 
with the contrarian strategy in finance. This consistency cannot be attributed to data 
snooping as the studies in the finance literature are based on different data. The findings 
imply that high initial yield office portfolios in the sample outperformed low yield prime 
office portfolios during the period under investigation. If the results can be generalized in 
any way, one may safely conclude that property investors should seriously consider 
contrarian real estate investment if they want to improve the performance of their 
portfolios. More research is, however, needed on the topic to validate/invalidate these 
results to help property investors make sound investment decisions to improve their 
investment return. 
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Notes: 
 
1 Boykin and Gray (1994) trace the historical development of GIM in real estate appraisal 
and relate GIM to the price/earnings ratio that is frequently used in stock valuation and 
serves as a benchmark in the value approach to investing. 
 
 
2 Marcato (2004) uses the terms “value” and “growth” properties in his paper on creating 
style indexes in real estate markets. 
 
3 The choice of cities (markets) used for the study is constrained by the datasets and 
therefore data availability. Other Asia Pacific cities are not included in the study simply 
because of want of data. 
 
4 Notwithstanding the consistency of the results with the finance literature, one should 
note the significant differences between the studies in finance (based on stocks) and this 
study which is based on real property. Apart from the difference in liquidity of assets, 
studies in the finance literature are based on prices while this study is based on valuation 
estimates (capital values) and market rentals. Furthermore, while the studies in finance 
are based on prices of individual stocks, this study is based on sub-market averages. 
Although one may argue about the validity of results based on averages, the fact that the 
results are consistent with the finance literature may imply that it may not be prudent for 
one to tersely underestimate the validity of the results. After all, all studies that are based 
on market indices are based on average market figures; yet their validity is scarcely 
questioned. More research is, however, needed before any firm conclusion can be made.
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Table 1a: Composition of Decile Portfolios (1994 Q2 to 1999 Q2) 
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Auckland CBD 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 
Auckland Non-CBD 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Bangkok CBD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Beijing CBD                                 1 2 2 2 
HK Central 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
HK Wanchai 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 
HK Tsimshatsui 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
HK East                                         
Jakarta CBD 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 
KLCity Centre 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
KL Decentralised 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Makati CBD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Seoul CBD                                         
Seoul Yoido CBD                                         
Seoul Gangnam CBD                                         
Shanghai Puxi 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Shanghai Pudong                 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 
Raffles Place* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Shenton Way*                 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Marina Bay*                                         
Tokyo CBD                          3 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 
* Singapore 
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Table 1b: Composition of Decile Portfolios (1999 Q2 to 2004 Q2) 
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Auckland CBD 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Auckland Non-CBD 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Bangkok CBD 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Beijing CBD 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 
HK Central 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 
HK Wanchai 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
HK Tsimshatsui 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
HK East 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Jakarta CBD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
KLCity Centre 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
KL Decentralised 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Makati CBD 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Seoul CBD   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 
Seoul Yoido CBD   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Seoul Gangnam CBD   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Shanghai Puxi 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Shanghai Pudong 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Raffles Place* 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 
Shenton Way* 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 
Marina Bay*           3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 
Tokyo CBD  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 
* Singapore
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Table 2: Median Rental-to-Price Ratio 
  Quartiles 
  1 2 3 4 
Time Period* Value     Growth 
          
94Q1 to 94Q2 10.13% 9.04% 5.40% 4.23% 
94Q2 to 94Q3 10.20% 8.88% 5.25% 4.27% 
94Q3 to 94Q4 10.21% 8.68% 5.12% 4.31% 
94Q4 to 95Q1 10.27% 8.53% 5.01% 4.24% 
95Q1 to 95Q2 9.80% 8.46% 4.80% 4.17% 
95Q2 to 95Q3 9.96% 8.27% 4.84% 4.20% 
95Q3 to 95Q4 10.08% 8.08% 4.87% 4.22% 
95Q4 to 96Q1 10.24% 7.86% 5.00% 3.97% 
96Q1 to 96Q2 11.61% 7.65% 5.13% 3.94% 
96Q2 to 96Q3 11.01% 7.59% 4.95% 3.90% 
96Q3 to 96Q4 10.37% 7.46% 4.74% 3.93% 
96Q4 to 97Q1 9.75% 7.46% 4.26% 3.78% 
97Q1 to 97Q2 9.34% 7.39% 4.17% 3.51% 
97Q2 to 97Q3 9.48% 7.35% 4.24% 3.60% 
97Q3 to 97Q4 9.65% 7.33% 4.56% 3.64% 
97Q4 to 98Q1 9.83% 7.04% 4.46% 3.54% 
98Q1 to 98Q2 10.37% 7.52% 4.61% 3.58% 
98Q2 to 98Q3 9.66% 7.50% 4.73% 3.64% 
98Q3 to 98Q4 9.10% 7.54% 4.78% 3.72% 
98Q4 to 99Q1 9.26% 6.90% 4.73% 3.81% 
99Q1 to 99Q2 10.05% 6.51% 5.20% 4.00% 
99Q2 to 99Q3 10.41% 6.56% 5.86% 4.14% 
99Q3 to 99Q4 10.73% 6.40% 5.42% 4.03% 
99Q4 to 00Q1 11.88% 6.34% 4.87% 3.91% 
00Q1 to 00Q2 13.69% 7.32% 5.28% 4.02% 
00Q2 to 00Q3 13.05% 7.47% 5.58% 4.17% 
00Q3 to 00Q4 12.44% 7.66% 5.66% 4.32% 
00Q4 to 01Q1 11.54% 8.28% 5.71% 4.47% 
01Q1 to 01Q2 11.01% 8.18% 5.70% 4.40% 
01Q2 to 01Q3 10.03% 7.69% 5.72% 4.36% 
01Q3 to 01Q4 10.04% 7.75% 5.66% 4.30% 
01Q4 to 02Q1 9.57% 8.19% 5.43% 4.03% 
02Q1 to 02Q2 9.26% 8.41% 5.53% 3.91% 
02Q2 to 02Q3 9.28% 8.41% 5.39% 4.06% 
02Q3 to 02Q4 9.45% 8.25% 5.35% 3.90% 
02Q4 to 03Q1 8.85% 7.86% 5.44% 3.92% 
03Q1 to 03Q2 9.04% 7.78% 5.17% 3.93% 
03Q2 to 03Q3 8.98% 8.01% 4.71% 3.68% 
03Q3 to 03Q4 8.96% 8.20% 5.33% 3.93% 
03Q4 to 04Q1 8.69% 7.86% 5.32% 4.07% 
          
First-quarter 1994 to First-quarter 2004: 
Mean 10.69% 7.67% 5.21% 3.76% 
Minimum 7.42% 5.48% 3.98% 1.86% 
Median 9.88% 7.66% 5.11% 3.97% 
Maximum 22.32% 9.42% 7.13% 5.11% 
* The overlapping periods accommodate investors who enter the market at different periods. 
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Table 3: Returns for Quartile Portfolios (1-quarter Holding-Period) 
  Initial Yield Quartiles   
Time Period 1 2 3 4 Spread between 
1 & 4   Value     Growth 
94Q2 - 94Q3 17.98% 9.55% 10.52% 9.37% 8.62% 
94Q3 - 94Q4 17.64% 9.29% 10.26% 9.02% 8.62% 
94Q4 - 95Q1 17.41% 9.15% 10.02% 7.94% 9.47% 
95Q1 - 95Q2 13.10% 7.03% 0.49% 5.80% 7.30% 
95Q2 - 95Q3 12.80% 8.51% 1.32% 3.87% 8.93% 
95Q3 - 95Q4 12.52% 8.46% 1.51% 4.03% 8.49% 
95Q4 - 96Q1 12.19% 8.39% 0.89% 3.50% 8.70% 
96Q1 - 96Q2 11.81% 6.80% 14.09% 7.55% 4.26% 
96Q2 - 96Q3 11.31% 6.73% 12.79% 7.37% 3.95% 
96Q3 - 96Q4 10.77% 6.58% 10.62% 8.01% 2.75% 
96Q4 - 97Q1 10.25% 6.46% 9.95% 7.86% 2.39% 
97Q1 - 97Q2 3.11% 2.36% 3.50% -0.39% 3.50% 
97Q2 - 97Q3 5.50% -2.66% 2.66% -0.49% 5.99% 
97Q3 - 97Q4 5.93% -5.73% 2.48% -0.62% 6.55% 
97Q4 - 98Q1 5.46% -8.69% 0.83% 0.63% 4.83% 
98Q1 - 98Q2 3.32% 5.16% -5.00% -1.30% 4.62% 
98Q2 - 98Q3 5.14% -0.39% -2.75% -6.17% 11.30% 
98Q3 - 98Q4 7.11% -1.37% -4.00% -8.15% 15.26% 
98Q4 - 99Q1 0.46% 2.17% -5.86% -9.65% 10.12% 
99Q1 - 99Q2 9.49% 4.22% 6.31% 4.25% 5.23% 
99Q2 - 99Q3 9.18% 1.99% 6.54% 3.63% 5.55% 
99Q3 - 99Q4 5.57% 5.37% 4.65% 4.30% 1.27% 
99Q4 - 00Q1 11.58% 6.12% 3.85% 4.09% 7.50% 
00Q1 - 00Q2 14.39% 10.61% 5.33% 2.88% 11.51% 
00Q2 - 00Q3 19.66% 8.86% 5.73% 2.73% 16.93% 
00Q3 - 00Q4 14.78% 8.14% 6.90% 3.18% 11.60% 
00Q4 - 01Q1 14.65% 6.12% 7.29% 3.32% 11.32% 
01Q1 - 01Q2 11.83% 6.18% 3.77% -0.30% 12.13% 
01Q2 - 01Q3 12.15% 5.09% 4.74% -0.16% 12.31% 
01Q3 - 01Q4 18.03% 7.59% 2.06% 0.46% 17.58% 
01Q4 - 02Q1 7.25% 7.98% 0.24% 0.21% 7.03% 
02Q1 - 02Q2 10.10% 8.28% 3.80% 0.85% 9.25% 
02Q2 - 02Q3 13.51% 8.43% 2.72% 2.18% 11.33% 
02Q3 - 02Q4 17.22% 7.57% 0.85% -0.21% 17.43% 
02Q4 - 03Q1 5.98% 8.31% 2.71% 1.35% 4.63% 
03Q1 - 03Q2 11.05% 8.35% 3.65% 0.14% 10.91% 
03Q2 - 03Q3 11.02% 7.23% 0.03% -4.31% 15.33% 
03Q3 - 03Q4 14.63% 9.15% 4.36% 4.46% 10.17% 
03Q4 - 04Q1 7.76% 6.67% 9.01% 6.95% 0.81% 
04Q1 - 04Q2 13.90% 10.16% 21.92% 8.40% 5.50% 
            
Quarter Performance for Portfolios in the Period 94Q2 to 04Q2: 
Arithmetic 
Mean Return 10.94% 5.76% 4.52% 2.41% 8.52% 
Mean 
Volatility      4.62% 4.29% 5.39% 4.48% 4.36% 
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Table 4: Returns for Quartile Portfolios (3-year Holding-Period) 
  Initial Yield Quartiles   
Time Period 1 2 3 4 Spread between 1 
& 4   Value     Growth 
94Q2 - 97Q2 309.06% 139.56% 104.67% 121.85% 187.21% 
94Q3 - 97Q3 246.04% 123.22% 83.78% 110.43% 135.61% 
94Q4 - 97Q4 187.34% 107.60% 65.47% 99.69% 87.65% 
95Q1 - 98Q1 131.40% 80.49% 60.75% 90.70% 40.70% 
95Q2 - 98Q2 122.39% 74.88% 66.41% 53.18% 69.21% 
95Q3 - 98Q3 113.34% 57.18% 55.31% 40.17% 73.17% 
95Q4 - 98Q4 104.36% 39.13% 41.54% 25.68% 78.69% 
96Q1 - 99Q1 95.31% 20.26% 26.87% 11.14% 84.17% 
96Q2 - 99Q2 97.72% 23.25% 19.18% -0.27% 97.99% 
96Q3 - 99Q3 87.25% 26.12% 12.95% -4.40% 91.65% 
96Q4 - 99Q4 77.44% 28.79% 7.31% -8.36% 85.80% 
97Q1 - 00Q1 68.16% 31.38% 28.21% -26.78% 94.94% 
97Q2 - 00Q2 81.27% 29.33% 35.49% -22.67% 103.94% 
97Q3 - 00Q3 69.47% 55.28% 17.74% -2.71% 72.19% 
97Q4 - 00Q4 67.74% 72.51% 8.93% 12.25% 55.49% 
98Q1 - 01Q1 66.46% 100.90% 13.90% 15.33% 51.13% 
98Q2 - 01Q2 103.27% 77.53% 27.73% 12.84% 90.43% 
98Q3 - 01Q3 84.74% 111.82% 47.20% 9.87% 74.87% 
98Q4 - 01Q4 104.47% 114.89% 44.91% 28.07% 76.40% 
99Q1 - 02Q1 134.21% 112.75% 68.01% 30.31% 103.89% 
99Q2 - 02Q2 133.09% 119.53% 78.70% 21.75% 111.34% 
99Q3 - 02Q3 280.07% 145.96% 78.46% 26.09% 253.97% 
99Q4 - 02Q4 319.09% 142.27% 80.25% 20.71% 298.38% 
00Q1 - 03Q1 295.97% 143.36% 81.64% 17.55% 278.42% 
00Q2 - 03Q2 319.80% 109.76% 83.91% 16.04% 303.76% 
00Q3 - 03Q3 292.67% 97.43% 63.90% 14.40% 278.27% 
00Q4 - 03Q4 287.24% 88.91% 69.30% 15.80% 271.44% 
01Q1 - 04Q1 254.47% 98.17% 71.67% 18.10% 236.37% 
01Q2 - 04Q2 258.10% 141.31% 81.79% 24.41% 233.68% 
            
Quarter Performance for Portfolios in the Period 94Q2 to 04Q2: 
Arithmetic Mean Return 165.24% 86.67% 52.62% 26.59% 138.65% 
Mean Volatility      93.88% 41.37% 27.81% 36.42% 87.12% 
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Table 5: Returns for Quartile Portfolios (5-year Holding-Period) 
  Initial Yield Quartiles   
Time Period 1 2 3 4 Spread 
between 1 & 4   Value     Growth 
94Q2 - 99Q2 445.21% 138.18% 30.80% 145.28% 299.93% 
94Q3 - 99Q3 389.81% 137.46% 26.75% 130.82% 258.99% 
94Q4 - 99Q4 339.59% 136.48% 22.62% 117.04% 222.55% 
95Q1 - 00Q1 293.56% 115.15% 29.92% 105.61% 187.95% 
95Q2 - 00Q2 268.45% 133.13% 76.77% 46.52% 221.93% 
95Q3 - 00Q3 242.26% 131.17% 82.91% 50.09% 192.18% 
95Q4 - 00Q4 209.90% 129.00% 89.69% 50.53% 159.37% 
96Q1 - 01Q1 184.79% 127.10% 98.67% 51.02% 133.77% 
96Q2 - 01Q2 186.64% 127.66% 78.65% 30.18% 156.46% 
96Q3 - 01Q3 171.95% 128.63% 70.02% 17.61% 154.34% 
96Q4 - 01Q4 167.95% 129.89% 57.44% 7.92% 160.03% 
97Q1 - 02Q1 163.70% 130.33% 61.92% -9.49% 173.20% 
97Q2 - 02Q2 193.52% 127.19% 63.20% -6.73% 200.25% 
97Q3 - 02Q3 191.43% 167.40% 47.56% 6.36% 185.07% 
97Q4 - 02Q4 196.85% 201.60% 29.38% 18.32% 178.53% 
98Q1 - 03Q1 205.17% 258.15% 29.32% 20.38% 184.79% 
98Q2 - 03Q2 283.25% 226.23% 48.27% 14.44% 268.81% 
98Q3 - 03Q3 255.19% 291.14% 56.88% 13.35% 241.84% 
98Q4 - 03Q4 307.76% 292.00% 63.85% 34.13% 273.63% 
99Q1 - 04Q1 373.71% 287.46% 97.79% 52.72% 320.98% 
99Q2 - 04Q2 383.11% 320.23% 146.84% 52.41% 330.70% 
            
Quarter Performance for Portfolios in the Period 94Q2 to 04Q2: 
Arithmetic 
Mean 
Return 
259.71% 177.88% 62.35% 45.17% 214.54% 
Mean 
Volatility      
85.17% 69.88% 30.79% 44.36% 57.92% 
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Table 6: Returns for Quartile Portfolios (Entire Holding-Period) 
  Initial Yield Quartiles   
Time Period 1 2 3 4 Spread 
between 1 & 4   Value     Growth 
94Q2 - 04Q2 2117.48% 956.51% 258.35% 274.12% 1843.36% 
94Q3 - 04Q2 1779.51% 864.43% 224.24% 242.08% 1537.43% 
94Q4 - 04Q2 1497.66% 782.46% 194.08% 213.78% 1283.88% 
95Q1 - 04Q2 1260.77% 492.04% 275.80% 190.70% 1070.08% 
95Q2 - 04Q2 1103.14% 644.82% 199.32% 159.70% 943.44% 
95Q3 - 04Q2 966.66% 586.42% 195.41% 150.02% 816.63% 
95Q4 - 04Q2 847.97% 532.88% 191.02% 140.35% 707.62% 
96Q1 - 04Q2 744.94% 483.87% 188.46% 132.23% 612.70% 
96Q2 - 04Q2 707.78% 446.70% 152.84% 85.31% 622.46% 
96Q3 - 04Q2 625.68% 412.20% 173.47% 48.27% 577.41% 
96Q4 - 04Q2 555.15% 380.60% 147.21% 37.27% 517.88% 
97Q1 - 04Q2 494.23% 351.45% 110.07% 33.10% 461.13% 
97Q2 - 04Q2 434.44% 389.05% 106.75% 33.63% 400.82% 
97Q3 - 04Q2 408.10% 400.93% 106.70% 32.57% 375.53% 
97Q4 - 04Q2 379.64% 431.40% 87.50% 42.00% 337.64% 
98Q1 - 04Q2 354.79% 481.95% 85.96% 41.10% 313.69% 
98Q2 - 04Q2 466.08% 344.71% 99.66% 41.69% 424.39% 
98Q3 - 04Q2 392.97% 386.25% 123.28% 38.52% 354.45% 
98Q4 - 04Q2 402.30% 353.40% 115.04% 63.47% 338.83% 
99Q1 - 04Q2 428.94% 318.86% 145.60% 67.98% 360.96% 
            
Quarter Performance for Portfolios in the Period 94Q2 to 04Q2: 
Arithmetic 
Mean 
Return 
798.41% 502.05% 159.04% 103.39% 695.02% 
Mean 
Volatility      
510.25% 180.08% 55.94% 78.41% 434.91% 
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Table 7: Tests for Equality of Means 
Holding Period 
Value-
Growth 
Spread 
t test 
Test 
statisic t 
p-
value 
95% Confidence Interval 
Quarterly 8.52% 
Pooled-
variance 
8.38 0.000 (0.0650 , 0.1055) 
    
Separate-
variance 
8.38 0.000 (0.0650 , 0.1055) 
3 Years 138.65% 
Pooled-
variance 
7.41 0.000 (1.0119 , 1.7611) 
    
Separate-
variance 
7.41 0.000 (1.0072 , 1.7657) 
5 Years 214.54% 
Pooled-
variance 
10.24 0.000 (1.7218 , 2.5689) 
    
Separate-
variance 
10.24 0.000 (1.7174 , 2.5734) 
Entire Period 695.02% 
Pooled-
variance 
6.15 0.000 (3.1336 , 6.1332) 
    
Separate-
variance 
6.15 0.000 (3.1108 , 6.1560) 
 
Table 8a: Four States of the World 
Period Classification Period Classification Period Classification Period Classification 
94Q2 - 
94Q3 
NW10 
96Q4 - 
97Q1 
NB10 
99Q2 - 
99Q3 
NW10 
01Q4 - 
02Q1 
NB10 
94Q3 - 
94Q4 
NB10 
97Q1 - 
97Q2 
NW10 
99Q3 - 
99Q4 
W10 
02Q1 - 
02Q2 
NB10 
94Q4 - 
95Q1 
W10 
97Q2 - 
97Q3 
B10 
99Q4 - 
00Q1 
B10 
02Q2 - 
02Q3 
W10 
95Q1 - 
95Q2 
B10 
97Q3 - 
97Q4 
W10 
00Q1 - 
00Q2 
W10 
02Q3 - 
02Q4 
NW10 
95Q2 - 
95Q3 
NB10 
97Q4 - 
98Q1 
W10 
00Q2 - 
00Q3 
NB10 
02Q4 - 
03Q1 
NW10 
95Q3 - 
95Q4 
NW10 
98Q1 - 
98Q2 
B10 
00Q3 - 
00Q4 
NW10 
03Q1 - 
03Q2 
W10 
95Q4 - 
96Q1 
B10 
98Q2 - 
98Q3 
W10 
00Q4 - 
01Q1 
NB10 
03Q2 - 
03Q3 
B10 
96Q1 - 
96Q2 
NB10 
98Q3 - 
98Q4 
B10 
01Q1 - 
01Q2 
W10 
03Q3 - 
03Q4 
B10 
96Q2 - 
96Q3 
NW10 
98Q4 - 
99Q1 
NB10 
01Q2 - 
01Q3 
NW10 
03Q4 - 
04Q1 
B10 
96Q3 - 
96Q4 
NB10 
99Q1 - 
99Q2 
B10 
01Q3 - 
01Q4 
W10 
04Q1 - 
04Q2 
NW10 
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Figure 1a: Stochastic Dominance of Contrarian Real Estate Investment (Quarterly Holding 
Period)
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Figure 1b: Stochastic Dominance Analysis of Contrarian Real Estate Investment (3-Year Holding Period)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
-50.00% 0.00% 50.00% 100.00% 150.00% 200.00% 250.00% 300.00% 350.00%
Return
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e 
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 D
is
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
Value Portfolio Value 2 Growth 2 Growth Portfolio
                                                                                                  
 
 
     
Figure 1c: Stochastic Dominance Analysis of Contrarian Real Estate Investment (5-Year Holding 
Period)
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Figure 1d:Stochastic Dominance Analysis of Contrarian Real Estate Investment (>=5-Year Holding Period)
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Figure 2: Pacific Basin Real Estate (Datastream)
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Table 8b: Performance of Portfolios in Best and Worst Times 
        Tests for Equality of Means 
  Value Growth Spread t test Test statistic t 
p-
value 
Worst 10 quarters 10.83% 1.14% 9.69% Pooled-variance 4.92 0.000 
        Separate-variance 4.92 0.000 
Next Worst 10 Quarters 11.81% 3.66% 8.16% Pooled-variance 4.34 0.000 
        Separate-variance 4.34 0.001 
Next Best 10 Quarters 11.54% 3.38% 8.16% Pooled-variance 3.34 0.004 
        Separate-variance 3.34 0.004 
Best 10 Quarters 9.57% 1.48% 8.09% Pooled-variance 4.23 0.001 
        Separate-variance 4.23 0.001 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Test for Equality of Variances  
Holding Period 
Test 
statistics 
p-
value 
95% Bonferroni confidence intervals Decision 
Value Growth α = 0.05 α = 0.01 
Quarterly 0.12 0.732 (0.0368 , 0.0616) (0.0357 , 0.0597) 
Do not 
reject 
Do not 
reject 
3 Years 15.33 0.000 (0.7217 , 1.3298) (0.2800 , 0.5158) Reject Reject 
5 Years 8.46 0.006 (0.6283 , 1.3022) (0.3272 , 0.6781) Reject Reject 
Entire Period 21.76 0.000 (3.7598 , 6.2919) (0.5298 , 0.8865) Reject Reject 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Coefficient of Variation 
Holding Period 
Quartile 
Portfolio 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Return 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Return to 
Risk 
Quarterly Value 4.62% 10.94% 0.42 2.37 
  Growth 4.48% 2.41% 1.86 0.54 
3 Years Value 93.88% 165.24% 0.57 1.76 
  Growth 36.42% 26.59% 1.37 0.73 
5 Years Value 85.17% 259.71% 0.33 3.05 
  Growth 44.36% 45.17% 0.98 1.02 
Entire Period Value 510.25% 798.41% 0.64 1.56 
  Growth 78.41% 103.39% 0.76 1.32 
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Table 11: Initial Yields, Past Performance, and Future Performance of Value and Glamour Properties 
Panel A: Initial Yields   Panel B: Past Performance 
      Value Growth       Value Growth 
1999 
Q1-
Q2 
Initial Yield 0.1005 0.0400 
  
    
Capital 
Growth 
Rental 
Growth 
Capital 
Growth 
Rental 
Growth 
1999 
Q2-
Q3 
Portfolio 
Composition 
Bangkok CBD Auckland CBD   1994 Q3 2.49% 1.29% 6.60% 9.65% 
Jakarta CBD Raffles Place     Q4 2.26% 0.79% 6.33% 8.37% 
KLCC Shenton Way   1995 Q1 2.14% 0.68% 5.13% 7.66% 
Makati CBD Tokyo CBD      Q2 0.00% 1.03% 2.41% 5.30% 
              Q3 -0.05% 1.28% 2.85% 5.38% 
              Q4 -0.03% 0.89% 3.30% 5.04% 
            1996 Q1 -0.07% 0.98% 2.90% 4.59% 
              Q2 -0.42% -0.72% 2.74% 2.27% 
              Q3 -0.47% -0.78% 2.62% 2.46% 
              Q4 -0.56% -1.19% 2.51% 2.38% 
            1997 Q1 -0.61% -0.91% 2.66% 2.35% 
              Q2 -7.88% -6.58% -2.39% -3.39% 
              Q3 -8.92% -7.12% -2.58% -3.64% 
              Q4 -10.38% -8.32% -2.77% -3.98% 
            1998 Q1 -12.58% -9.88% -2.91% -4.20% 
              Q2 -5.34% -4.35% -4.84% -2.41% 
              Q3 -6.17% -5.19% -5.87% -2.74% 
              Q4 -7.21% -5.30% -7.06% -3.10% 
            1999 Q1 -8.95% -6.44% -8.10% -3.39% 
              Q2 -0.43% -2.87% -0.11% 0.26% 
                        
            
Geometric 
Average 
Growth 
Rate 
-3.27% -2.70% 0.08% 1.35% 
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Table 11: Fundamental Variables, Past 
Performance, and Future Performance of Value 
and Glamour Properties 
Panel C: Future Performance 
    Value Growth 
    
Capital 
Growth 
Rental 
Growth 
Capital 
Growth 
Rental 
Growth 
1999 Q3 -0.47% -2.93% -0.33% 0.33% 
  Q4 -0.58% -3.11% -0.56% 0.18% 
2000 Q1 -0.62% -3.71% -0.66% 0.07% 
  Q2 -1.52% -1.55% -1.48% 6.03% 
  Q3 -2.67% -3.05% -1.36% 5.57% 
  Q4 -4.25% -5.93% -1.24% 5.20% 
2001 Q1 -3.39% -4.07% -0.71% 4.81% 
  Q2 -2.28% -1.93% -4.75% -2.28% 
  Q3 -2.64% -4.41% -4.69% -2.45% 
  Q4 0.39% -0.06% -4.98% -2.95% 
2002 Q1 -0.82% -0.48% -5.40% -3.28% 
  Q2 0.40% -1.20% -2.78% -1.26% 
  Q3 1.00% -1.04% -1.16% -0.90% 
  Q4 -1.97% -2.53% -2.79% -2.33% 
2003 Q1 0.53% 0.10% -1.64% -1.17% 
  Q2 0.54% -0.36% -3.39% -3.32% 
  Q3 2.38% 1.64% -4.29% -5.47% 
  Q4 2.72% 1.89% 1.07% -0.75% 
2004 Q1 1.69% 0.48% 1.96% 1.71% 
  Q2 3.50% 2.40% 2.02% 2.02% 
            
Geometric 
Average 
Growth 
Rate 
-0.42% -1.52% -1.88% -0.06% 
 
 
Table 12: Growth of Rental Income Per Dollar (2nd Quarter 1999 = Year 0) 
Year 
Growth 
Portfolio 
Value 
Portfolio 
Year 
Growth 
Portfolio 
Value 
Portfolio 
0 0.0400 0.1005 13 0.0476 0.0704 
1 0.0405 0.0978 14 0.0483 0.0685 
2 0.0411 0.0951 15 0.0489 0.0667 
3 0.0416 0.0926 16 0.0496 0.0649 
4 0.0422 0.0901 17 0.0502 0.0631 
5 0.0428 0.0876 18 0.0509 0.0614 
6 0.0434 0.0853 19 0.0516 0.0597 
7 0.0439 0.0830 20 0.0523 0.0581 
8 0.0445 0.0807 21 0.0530 0.0566 
9 0.0451 0.0786 22 0.0537 0.0550 
10 0.0457 0.0764 23 0.0545 0.0536 
11 0.0464 0.0744       
12 0.0470 0.0724       
 
